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INTRODUCTION
No Catholic philosopher, in as much as he is a Catholic,
can deny that God is infinite or that this infinity may be
proven trom reason.

As a philosopher, however, he mayor

may not construe a proof which will with certitude prove the
infinity of God.

He may, moreover, fail to see precisely

what is the nature of this infinity.

The purpose of this

paper is to consider the philosophical treatment of infinity
as presented by Francis Suarez, S.l.

The paper will present

the concept of infinity as understood by Suarez and his
proofs for the actual infinity of God, and will endeavor to
give a criticism of the position of Suarez.
Owing to the

diffe~ence

between the philosophy of St.

Thomas and that of Suarez it is sometimes questioned whether
or not Suarez can prove that God is infinite.

The points

which give rise to this question are the different concepts
of being, of act and potency, and the different principles
which follow on these concepts.

The chief proof which Tho-

mists employ for the infinity of God is based on a principle
of act and potency, namely that an act Which is not received
into a potency is without limit, infinite.

1

Since Suarez

2
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does not hold that an act can be limited only by potency,
it is doubted whether he can prove infinity.

Even Thomists,

however, use other arguments to demonstrate that God is infinite, especially the argument from creation.

But here

again, since the fact of creation and the consequent reasoning to infinity cannot be demonstrated without making use
of the concepts of act and potency and of being itself,
Thomists question the validity of the

Suare~ian

approach.

Before actually getting into the matter it seems well
to recall what infinity means.
not limited.

Infinite means not finite,

The notion is first had from an analogy with

quantity, which we know from experience as having actual
limitation.

A stick Which is three feet long has a certain

positive extension.

When compared with a stick six feet in

length it is seen to lack something, to be limited.

'lio this

concept of limitation the intellect can prefix a negative
and arrive at the concept of non-limitation.
This concept of non'-limitation, however, is not restricted to the genus of quantity, but may be applied to
other perfections and even to being itself.

+~

One white object

compared with a brighter object may be said to lack a certain
whiteness.

]'rom this notion of limited whiteness the mind

can rise to the concept of unlimited, or infinite, whiteness.

3

A stone when oompared with a man is oertainly seen
something of being that the man has, to be limited.

t~'laok

From

this the mind oan rise to the oonoept of infinite being.
These few examples, however, are not enough to give an
understanding of infinity.

There are various interpretations

whioh ought to be taken into oonsideration.

A certain being

may be infinite, that is, laok all terms or limits, and yet
be naturally destined to have limits.

Such, for example, is

prime matter, whioh is said to be infinite privative, that
is, in virtue of the privation of the limits whioh it is ordained to have.

In opposition to this infinity is infinity

negative

the infinity of a being whioh is in no way

s~ta,

destined to have limits.
There is categorematio and

sy~oategorematio

infinity.

That being is syncategorematically infinite which is limited
with respect to the act which it has now, but which can have
this act increased ad infinitum.

A six inch line, for ex-

ample, has a definite, limited extension, but its extension
can be added to without limit.

A being is categorematioally

infinite if the aot. which it has here and now is absolutely
wi thout limit.
Finally there is intensive and extensive infinity. Extensive infinity may be predicated of a passive, or an active

4

potenoy.

.'

Prime matter, for example, is extensively infinite

beoause it is in potenoy to an infinite number of forms.

The

omnipotenoe of God is extensively infinite beoause it oan produoe an infinite number of effeots.

It must be noted, of

oourse, that, sinoe God is Pure Aot, there is no suoh thing
as His being in potenoy to these various effeots.

Finally

the perfeotion of God is extensively infinite in So far as
it embraces eminently all the possible perfections of creatures.

Intensive infinity, on the other hand, is the infinity

of an act, precisely in so far as it is an act.
The infinity Which we predicate of God must be that of
~

itself, not merely of quantity or some quality.

be oategorematic.

It must

It must be infinity negative sumpta.

And

while God is extensively infinite, He must also be shown to
be intensively infinite.

Nor is this postulate a prejudicing

of the question; as will be seen, Suarez himself demands that
such be the infinity of God.

.'
CHAPTER I
INFINITY IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

To examine the position ot all the philosophers who
preceded Suarez would hardly be in place in such a paper
as this.

It will be sutticient to present the notions

or

several men who may be oonsidered as having speoial intluenoe
on the Scholastio Philosophy which Suarez protessed.
The true conoept ot the nature ot God and His intinity
seems to be peculiar to Christians, that is, to Christian
philosophers, who tirst peroeived God to be subsistent being.

Beginning with Plato we tind that the pagans never

arrived at the oonoept ot a Being who oould say ot himselt:
"I am Who am."

I t the question could be put to Plato, it

seems certain that he would reply that there is one supreme
being, but it is not at all oertain that this supreme being
would be, in his mind, the only divine being.

In the Timaeus

he tells us ot a god who is the tather and oause ot the uniTerse, who brought order into disorder.

1

plies oertaln orderless matter whioh does not have its

1

Plato, Timaeus, Loeb Classioal Library, Putnam's Sons,
New York, 1929, 28 . 6.
5

"

This in itselt im-

6

existence from the supreme being.

He goes on,

to

moreov~,

/

tell us that there are other, sidereal gods which the first
god produced.

2

Such a first cause as this, whatever Plato

may have thought about it, oan hardly possess an iffinity
of being.

However, we are hardly

justified in saying thet

this deity is the god which Plato would have professed in
the tinal analysis, since the question as to just what Plato
3

wanted his god to be is hotly disputed even by eminent scholars.
But even though' it is not certain what the god of Plato aOtually is, nor whether he ever actually affirmed or denied
infinity of the supreme being, it does seem certain that he
could never have rightly held a god who was truly intinite
in the realm of being, since " ••• for,Plato, there is no sense
4
of the word being reserved exclusively for God."
Sinoe he
did not hold that all beinas come from .Q!! Being alone,

tha t

is, since he did not hold that creation was necessary, he
could not have held real infinity.
Having said what Plato could not have held it would be
well to endeavor to give what he did hold, but, owing to tbB
allegorical way of speaking that he used and to the variant
2 Ibid. 41 A~.
3 J:iGilson, The Spirit ot Mediaeval Philosophy, Scribner's
Sons, New Yon, 19B6, 47-49.
4 Ibid. 48.

-

7

opinions that seem to run through his works, this is iot easy.
Perhaps, if we trust Aristotle to have understood his predecessor, we get a gleam of his thought by considering what
Aristotle has to say about it.
that Plato, along

~th

We are told in the Physics

the Pythagoreans, "regarded the un-

limited, or undetermined, as existing in itself, and not as
being a condition incident to something else, but having its
own independent substantive existence."

5

This would indicate

that he was at least on the right track, but what Aristotle
further tells us only brings us back to a contused notion.
For he says that Plato found the unlimited both in sense
objects and in the Ideas.

6

Aristotle apparently thinks that

Plato made no discrimination between the lack of determination
in material objects, and infinity

i~

spiritual beings.

It

this is true it would seem that he not only could not have
proven an infinite god, but didn't even

have the proper con-

cept of infinity.
While Aristotle's language is clearer, and free from
allegory, so that it is easier to determine what he meant to

.

"

say, still he does not seem to have gone beyond Plato in conceiving the notion of God.

He did come to the conclusion

5 Aristotle,. Physics, Loeb Classical Library, Putnam's
Sons, New York, 1929, III, iv, 203 A.
6 ~., 203 A.

8

that there had to be some immutable substanoe, some
mover.

~nmoved

This substanoe had to be infinite because "it causes

motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an in7
finite potentiality."
However, he went on to reason to the
existenoe of at least fifty-five such substances,

8

so that

for no one of them could he rightly claim real infinity.

In

spite of the tremendous advances Which he made over his predecessors he seems to have remained "profoundly impregnated
9

with polytheism."

This is oertainly reason enough for say-

ing that he could not prove an infinite god in the proper
sense.

In addition to this, however, he seems, like Plato,

never to have had a correot concept of infinity.
•

"The fact

is," he says, "that the unlimited is really the exaot opposite
of its usual desoription; for it is not that beyond whioh
there is nothing, but that of whioh there is always more
beyond."

10

Plotinus, in

t~e

third century atter Christ, expressly

declared that the One was infinite, because the One not only
could in no way be measured, but also was the source of in11
exhaustible and inconceiyable energy.
However, he too was
7 Aristotle, Metaphysios, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard
University Press,=tOnaon, 1935, XII, vii, 1073 A.
8 Ibid. 1074 A.
9 M.D.Roland-Gosselin, Aristote, Paris, 1938, p.97, oited
by Gilson, p.40.
10 Aristotle, Physics, III, vi, 207 A.
11 P. Descoqs, Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis, Paris,
1935, II, 011.

9

inclined to speak in metaphors, and so we do not

kno~,

just

what he understood by infinity. His emanation of all thizgs
12
from the One, since it seem to be a necessary diffusion of
the One, does not seem compatible with true infinity.

Such

an emanation, moreover, does not seem to leave creatures
contingent, and without a contingent world it hardly seems
possible to have a God who is perfectly and absolutely being.

13

Augustine, although he took much from the Platonists,
went beyond them to arrive at the real understanding of infinity.

Juat how he would prove the infinity of God the

author has not been able to discover, but his proper understanding of it seems evident.

He says that we must not

attribute any mode to Gcd lest we seem to limit Him.

How-

ever, we must not conceive Him as indetermined, since He is
the cause of all determination in beings.

This would seem

equivalent to making Him unlimited, not merely in potency,
Augustine goes on to
not attribute any particular mode to God,

but in act, and in the act of esse.
say that we must

for this might seem to say that He had received the perfection
trom without.

But:if we say that He is the absolute mode',"

summum modum, then Augustine agrees that we are getting
12 W. Turner, History of Philosophy, Ginn & Co., Boston,
1929, 206.
13 A. Pegis, §.i.:. Thomas ~ the Greeks, Marquette University
Press, Milwaukee, 1939, 81.

10

somewhere near the truth. 14
Finally in the thirteenth century came Thomas Aquinas
who truly perceived the meaning of infinity, and who gave
numerous proofs to demonstrate the ,infinity of God.

The

,. '0,

two most important proofs are those based on Godts being
esse sUbsistens and having the power of creation.

God does

not receive His being but simply ha, it from His Essence;
He is !!!! sUbsistens.

Since an act is limited only by po-

tency, this pure act of being is unlimited, infinite.

It

is in no way a passive potency, and so is not syncategorematic
infinity, nor infinity privative sumpta.

It is not quantity

or quality, but simply ~, containing all perfections
15
eminently.
God, moreover, created the world and all beings
other than Himself.

He produced them from no passive potency,

but simply willed and they were.

Before creation these

were nothing, they were infinitely distant from their
"infinite distans

~

actu. tt

bei~s

~,

To span such an infinite gap

an infinite power is required. "Oportet factoris virtutem
16
~ infinitam."
And since the power of God is one and
the same.as His essence, and His essence is one with His

14 Augustine, De Natura Boni, CXXII, t.VIII, Col 558, cited
by L'Abbe ~es Martin, St. Augustine, Libraire Felix
Alcan, Paris, 1923.
15 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Marietti, Taurini, 1937,I,q.7
16 T. Aquinas, Summa Contre Gentiles, Marietti, Taurini, 1894,
Lib. 1, c .43.

11

existence, He is being without limit.
Last of all in our historical sketch we treat Duns
Scotus, Doctor Subtilis, who certainly does not belie his
name in his exposition of the infinity of God.

His method

ot approach in proving the point is briefly presented by
Gilson.

,

For Duns scotus, in fact, it is altogether one and the same thing to
prove the existenoe of God and to
prove the existence of an infinite
being ••• Duns Scotus starts, in fact,
from the idea of being in order to
prove that we must necessarily admit
a first being; from the fact that it
is first he deduces that it is uncausable; from the fact that it is uncausable he deduces that this first
being exists necessarily. Passing on
to the properties ••• he shows that it
is efficient cause, endowed with intelligence and will, that its intelligence
embraces the infinite, and that since
this intelligence is. identical with its
essence, 1;s essence also envelops the
infinite.

Though we grant to Scotus that there is a first, uncaused, necessary, intelligent being there still remains a
question: how do we know that the Divine Intellect embraces
the infinite?

His answer is: "Intelligibilia sunt infinita

in potentia respectu intellectus creati, satis patet;
intellectu increato

17

E. Gilson,

OPe

~

!i 1A

simul omnia intellecta actu, quae

cit. 56-7.

~ creatp.~

successive intelligibilia."

18

12

.'

But is it so

evident that there are infinite possibles to be known?

SCotus

replies: " ••• quodlibet ponendum!!1 possibile, cuius BQa
apparet impossibilitas ••• " and "infinitas

~

repugnat enti."

To criticize briefly: the argument seen's to involve an illegitiffiate transit from the logical to the real.
Scotus gives another argument from the human will, but
he himself strews videtur so freely through the proof that
it seems not altogether convincing even to him.
Voluntas nostra omni finito aliquid
majus potest appetere at amare ••• , et
quod plus est, videtur inclinatio
naturalis ad summe amandum bonum infinitum ••• Videtur ••• , si infinitum
repugnaret bono, quod nullo modo
voluntas quietatur in boDO sub r~tione
infiniti, nec in illud facile tenderet."3)
This argument, too, as it appears, relies on the supposition
of the existence of the infinite.

It would be interesting

to push the analysis of this supposition farther, but for
the present we will relinquish it, to touch on it again in
the body of the paper.

18 J. Duns ScotU8, opu~ Oxoniense, apud L. Vives, PariS,
1893, I, d.2, q.2, ol.VIII, p.471. For a more complete
treatment see ;J. Marechal, Le Point ~ Depart de la
Metaphysigue, Felix Alcan, Paris, 1927, 150.
19 Duns Scotus, 478-9, also Marechal, 152.
20 Duns Scotus, 477, also Marechal, 150.

19
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CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF INFINITY ACCORDING TO SUAREZ
That being is omnipertect who possesses in

a~

higher manner the perfections of all other beings.

equal or
If a

being is omniperfect, it is also extensively infinite; but
it is not necessarily intensively infinite.
God who is omnipertect is also

It is true that

intensively infinite, but it

is not true that the concept of omnipertection includes the
note of intensive infinity.
Suarez, as we shall see, understood both omnipertection
and intensive infinity; but' at times he seems to contuse the
two, to make them identical.

Why did he do this? The answer

will be more evident, when we have-seen how he explained the
two cO'ncepts and how one ot his proofs for the infinity of
Go d proceeds.
The infinity ot God was tor Suarez the intensive infinity we described in the Introduction.
taken from an analogy with quantity.
~

it,~s

" ••• ad modum corporum

per proportionem ad ilIa apprehendimus !1 explicamus

reliqua omnia."

1

First of all

1

We see bodies with definite extension and

F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysllcae, sPUd
D. XXYIII, Sec.l, n.IS.
13

L~

Vi;ves, Paris,

14
weight.

Some are smaller and lighter than others,

we peroeive them to be limited.

a~d

So

This notion of more and

less taken from quantity is applied to other perfeotions
and even to being.

"Simili ergo analogia utimur ad deolaran-

dam perfeotionem entitativam ~ virtutem aotivarum rerum."2
One being has more perfections than another, or has the
same speoific perfeotion in a higher grade.
enim

~

in quo

rebus guamdam veluti latitud1nem perfeotion1s entis

~

var1i gradus ••• "

creatures to be limited.
~

f1nitum

gradum."4

3

~

intelligimus

!!! limitatum per quemdam proprium perfeotionis

From this ooncept of limitation we rise to the

simplioiter,

.!!.Q1!

perfectionis."5

~e,

And in this way we understand

"Et unumquodque

oonoept of an unlimited being.

finite.

"Apprehendimus

~:It

hoo .!!!!!. vooamus

in guantitate molis,

~

inf1n1~

1!! excellentia

It is preoisely in His ~ that He is in-

"Nos dicere possumus, hihil aliud !!!! Deo infinitum

guam

~

ipsYm Sllltl."

6

The infinity of God was for Suarez infinity negative
sumpta, not had in virtue of a privation of a due perfection.?

2
3

Ibid. n.1S.

'IOIQ. n.1S.

4 I'6Tci. n.1S.
5 Ibid. n.1S.
6 I15IC! • n.1S.
? 'IO'Ia. n.19.

15

It was the inf'inity
syncategorematic:

01'

act, not potency; cat egoremat !'c , not

"Neque potest virtus ilIa

~

inf'inita

sync at egoremat ice , quia simul et actu habet existentem
~

virtutem

!1

perfectionem."

8

t~

This is confirmed all the

more by his proofs, which we will consider later. He is
definitely out to prove that God is a pure, unlimited act
in the realm of' being.
In other texts, however, he seems to contuse infinity
with omniperf'ection.
f'initas

~e

---- - -

"Unde in ea etiam continetur ilIa in-

-

----

intelligitur in continentia omnis pertectionis

possibilis vel cogitabilis."

9

If this were the only in-

dication of' his contusing the two notions, it might be easily
explained away, by saying that he simply meant to identity
omniperf'ection and extensive infinity.
case.

But this is not the

In the f'irst proof' he gives for infinity it is clear

that he is confusing intensive infinity with omniperf'ection.
The proof says in brief:

God is infinite because His

inf'inity is the same as His omniperfection.
Imo hinc fit etiam consequens ut omnes

rationes quibus supra probavimus perf'ectionem prim! entis, aeque probent infinitatem eius, quia et modus pertectionls

8
9

.~

Ibid. D.XX, Sec. 2, n.4.
De Deo Uno et Trino, apud L. Vives, Paris, 1877,
Tract. I, LlD.-rI,-C:l:-n.5.

~uarez,

16

a nobis expositus convertitur cum in.'
finitate recte declarata et infinitas,
quatenus sub ilIa negatione perfectionem
indicat, pertinet ad perfectlonem
simpliciter, atque adeo ad summam entis

perfectionem.~O

Before beginning this proof he states, explicitly that he
intends to prove infinity as he has previously explained
it, and not merely under one aspect.
In the section immediately preceding the treatment of
infinity he explains and proves God's omniperfection.

God's

perfeotion oonsists in this, that He lacks no perfection that
is due to Him and that He has all perfection there is to be
had.

"Atgue hoo modo illud

perfeotio ita debita

!!1,

omnino deesse possit,
sensu dioitur .!!!!.!

~

~

~

~

dicitur perfectum oui omnis

necessario inest,

~

privative B!2 negative, et utrogue

1
essentia Dei, !!!!.! simpliciter perfeotum"

God can laek no due perfeotion, "quia siout Deus
ita

~

nulla ei

! ! habet totam perteotionem sibi debitam."

~ ~ ~,

12

He also

has all possible perfeotions, "quia ostensum est nihil esse
13
posse praeter ipsum, nisi ab 1pso."
And whatever has God
as cause must in some way be in

~od,

that is, virtually

~~d

eminently.

10 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Seo.2, n.21.
11 Ibid. D.XXX, Sec.l, n.!.
12 l'D1<l'. n.2.
13 Ibid. n.4.

17

Later we will have more cause to investigate how' Suarez
proves that all beings other than God proceed trom God as
their cause, while God himself is, was, and always will be a
necessary being.

For the present we will take tor granted

that this is proven, and simply question the fact of God's
being infinite as a
as the

aut~r

consequ~nce

of being omniperfect.

As tar

can determine, Suarez argues not from the fact

that God can lack no due perfection, but trom the fact that
He has all possible perfections.
Haec infinitas in nullo alio consistit,
nisi in hoc quod perfectio pr~i entis,
nec est ita praecisa ac definita ad
unum genus perfectionum, quae nos in
creaturis distingui videmus, ut illud
solum includat, et non cetera omnia, eo
eminentissimo modo qui ad summam perfectionem pertinere potest; neque etiam
in singulis perfectionum generibus ita
est limitata ad certum ali quem gradum
definitum qui in participato ente intelligi possit, quin habeat perfectionem
illam nobiliori et excellentiori modo
quam possit a creatura participari,
etiamsi magislit magis in infinitum
participetur.
This seems to me to say no more than that God has in an
eminent manner every creature perfection.

.

It says that He.,
is not limited to anyone genus of participated perfection,

but this is not the same as saying that He is absolutely

14

Ibid. D.XXX, Sec. 2, n.2l.

-

18

unlimited.

He is referring to the perfections of

th~se

creatures which we know on this earth, and to the perfections
of angels, provided there be such.

The supposition is that

these possible perfections are infinite.
that they are infinite?

But how do we know

Certainly from. experience we do not

know this, since we know only finite perfections, and would
seem to know only that the number and variety of possible
beings is indefinite.

The possibles nay well exceed the

capacity of our intellects as to their extent, but this does
not prove that they are infinite.

I do not see how we can

postulate that the possibles are infinite until we prove that
their cause is infinite, but this is precisely what remains
to be proved.
Had the argument been based on the fact that God can be
without no perfection that is His due, there would still be
.a difficulty.

For it would still be necessary to prove that

God actually should be infinite, before concluding that He
cannot lack infinity.
I think we can see now why Suarez seems to
two notions.

co~se th~

He would, I believe, see that the concept of

omniperfection does not necessarily include the note of infinity.

But, since he supposed the possibles to be infinite,

he thought that a proof of omniperfection automatically gave
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infinity, and so constantly identified the two when be treated them at the same time.
This one proof has been considered apart from the others
first of all because it serves very well to bring out what
Suarez understood by infinity.

Secondly it seems to miss the

point; to suppose what it was intended to prove; and so hardly deserves lengthy consideration.

-

.'
CHAPTER III
INFINITY OF GOD PROVED FROM

THE NOTION OF ENS A SE
nUnde

priori ostenditur infinitas virtutis

~

essentiae, et a posteriori, infinitas essentiae
1--

virtutis."

.

~

~

infinitate

intinitate

Thus Suarez points out the twofold method of

approach he will use.

There is no vicious circle invol*e4

in the statement, as might appear at first glance.
that from the nature, or the essence of God, to

He means

w~ich

he has

reasoned in a previous di$JUtation. he will show that God must
be infinite, that is, that an !B!
limited.

Secondly, from one

~

~ ~

must be absolutely un-

the effects of the Divine

Power, namely creation, which he believes to have been proven,
he will demonstrate that the cause-must be infinite.
That the foundation tor proving God's infinity is His
aseity, His being !!!! subsistens, Suarez repeats again and
. again.

"Dicere possumus nihil aliud
.

quam.!!!!! ipsum
est
1
2

~~

~,

!!!!!

~

per essentiam."

per essentiam ••• includit

Ibid. D.XXX, 8ec.2, n.l.
.ri.lS.

l'6"!'(t. D.XXVllJ:.~ StG~. :l"

esse infinitum

~ ~

~

2

".!!Q.2 ipso

~

perfectionem quae

2'1

!!! ~ simp1ioiter infinitum."
necessary being, infinite?

3

But why is an!.!!! ~,!!!., a

Aristotle, Plato, and other

Greeks held neoessary beings, that is, each held that there
were several necessary beings, and thus evidently did not consider infinity as immediately consequent on neoessity.
Suarez gives two proofs to demonstrate that !B!
necessarily infinite, one of which he explains as
the other as

~

priori.

~

is

posteriori,

As a matter of fact they coincide in

an important point to make one proof.
more properly an

~

~ ~

The second proof is

priori demonstration of .the validity of

the Minor of the first syllogism.
goes something like this.

Put briefly the argument

Participated, or limited, being is

limited for one of three reasons, -perhaps for all three
reasons.
give so

Either the efficient oause limits by deciding to
muc~

and no more, or the being is received into a

passive, real potency, or it is of itself, by virtue of its
essence, intrinseca1ly limited.
proven !B!

~!!

God, however, Who has been

can be limited in none of these ways, and so

is infinite.
Potest probari ••• , quia esse per
essentiam non habet unde 1imitetur;
esse enim participatum 1imitar1 potest
aut ex voluntate dantis tantam perfeot10nem et non majorem, aut ex

3

Ibid.

D.XXX, Sec. 2, n.20.
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capacitate recipientis, sive illa
.'
capaoitas intelligatur per modum
passivae poteat1ae, sive tantum per
modum objectivae, seu non repugnantiae;
in primo autem ente, quod ex se est suum
esse, nullum principium aut ra4io
limitationis intelligi potest.
We can readily concede that a being which is uncaused
and has being by virtue of its essence is neither limited by
an efficient cause, nor by being received into a passive
potency; and we can concede that God is suoh a being.

But

how do we know that there is no intrinsic limitation in such
a being?
proof.

The answer to this question is the. core of the
Suarez has several answers ready for us, which seem

capable of division into two general classes, which he would
again call
The

~

~

priori and

~

posteriori.

posteriori arguments are given in answer to an

objection which Suarez thinks someo#8 may propose.
Dices, siout prtmum ens ex se est, ita
ex se, et sine alia causa esse posse
limitatum ad certum genus vel gradum
perfectionis. Respondetur hoc repugnare
enti necessario ab intrinseco et ex se
habenti esse. Quod quidem a postesiori
et ab incommodis probari potest •••
Prior to this objection Suarez has given no reason why

~

se oannot be intrinsecally limited, but has Simply stated
4
5

Ibid. 8ec.2, n.22.

lb"ra. 1l.22.

A
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that it cannot.
first proof.

Th~

reply to this objection, then, ie the

But we sense a difficulty before we even come

to the proof, for the objection is not really one against infinity.

It is that too, but it is primarily an objection

against omniperfection.

As a result, this objection may be

well answered, but in such a way that we still will not have
infinity proven, but only omniperfection.
Here again Suarez does fail to perceive the difference
between proving infinity and omniperfection.

He gives three

reasons why God cannot be limited to om genus or one grade
of the perfections we know in creatures.
only that God is omniperfect.

"Quodeumque

Each demonstrates
~

perfeetionem, et quasi partem entis, potest
manare."

6

~

habens lim1tatam

primo

~

Granted that this is true, all that follows is

that God has all the perfections of all possible creatures
in an eminent way.

For the statement says merely that; there

is one Supreme Being who alone is the source of whatever else
is, or can be;

and it still remains to be proven that the

possibles actually are infinite.

MOreover, Suarez himself

holds that the infinity of the possibles is syncategorematic.
"In ~ ~ possunt ~ ~ syncategorematice infinita."7
6
7

Ibid. D.XXX, See. 2,n.22.
F. Suarez, ~ Incarnatione, apud L. Vives, Paris, 1877,
D. XXVI, Sec. 4, n. 12.
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.'

It would seem impossible, then, even though he should give
a demonstration for the infinity of the possibles, to argue
to oategorematic infinity for their oause.
His second reason for denying the possibility of intrinsic limitation is that a being limited to one type or grade
of perfection would not be completely perfect.
esset summe perfectum."

a

---

"Tale ens non

And since it has already been

demonstrated that there must be a first being who possesses
all perfection, it follows that this being must be without
limitation in perfection.
fection must be denied?

But just what limitation in perA being who is proven to be the

cause of every single existing, or possible perfection certainly cannot be limited to anyone perfection or to any group,
but must possess them all; but it does not follow that he is
simply infinite until it has been proven that the possible
perfections and beings are infinite.
The third reason which Suarez lists as
more properly called

~

~

posteriori seems

priori, but it labors under the same

difficulty as the other two.

He argues that if the first

being, that is, a necessary being were limited in the way the
objection limited it, there would be no repugnance in having

a

F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Sec. 2, n. 22.
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9

innumerable neoessary beings.

Aotually, however,

th~re

oan-

not be but one neoessary being, (his reasoning for one
neoessary being will be oonsidered in the next ohapter), and
so that one being must be unlimited.
We reoall that the objeotion was aimed against omniperfeotion.

The third reason is a reply to that objeotion.

For

if there is a neoessary being who does .not possess all the
perfeotions that we aotually know to be possible, then there
must be at least one other neoessary being who oan oause the
perfeotions not oontained by the,:t:f:Dst.

And if there oan be

more than one, there would seem to be no reason why there
should not be several.
But does this reasoning demonstrate that the first being
must be absolutely infinite?

Judg~ng

from the context, we oan

say that Suarez does not intend to prove any more than

omnip~

fection, that is, he intends to prove omnipert8otion, and
it for granted that he thus proves infinity..
it

t~s

For he plaoes

on a par with other two reasons already oonsidered, making

no explioit statement that it has further implioations th&n
the other two.

Furthermore, sinoe he does frequently identify

the two notions in his proofs, there is no oonolusive reason

9

1,lli. n.22.
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for thinking that he does otherwise in this plaoe.
There remains another oonsideration.

.'

Perhaps, even

though Suarez does not explioitly say so, this reason is in
itself suffioient to demonstrate more than omniperfection.
This will bear oonsiderable inYestigation.
oan oertainly say that oontingent,

~inite

First of

~ll,

we

beings of their

very nature allow the possibility of numerous individuals of
the same speoies.

It is also evident that a being whioh is

infinite in its very

~

must be one and only one.

The oon-

tingent beings permitmultiplioation beoause they have an external oause whioh oan produoe the same speoiffc essenoes
with different individuating notes.

It is true that the very

essenoe ot the finite beings is responsible for the intrinsio
possibility of this multiplication, but it is a possibility
that would never be realized without an extrinsio cause.

An

infinite being, on the other hand, sinoe it has from its very
essenoe all being that can possibly be had, permits neither
the intrinsio possibility, nor has an·external cause which
might produoe the various individuals.
Suppose now that there should be a neoessary, but finite,
being.

Such a being oould not be individuated by an external

oause, for in supposing it to be neoessary we exolude the
possibility of a oause.

But there remains the question of
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intrinsic possibility of multiplication, and thus
tigation is considerably narrowed.
to this.

th~

The question is resolved

Does the intrinsic impossibility of multiplication

in a necessary being equal infinity?

It is not clear that

Suarez may answer this question in the affirmative.
ted

inves-

to prove the

~dcity

He

attem,~

of a, necessary being by showing

that any multiplication, either in number or species, would
have to be had from something added to the necessity, but
that this differentiating note can be had neither from something, that is, some cause, outside the essence, nor trom the
10

essence itself.

If an external cause gave the differentiation,

the being would not be necessary.

If it came trom the

necessity of the being, each necessary being would have the
same note, the same differentiation, which is equivalent to
saying that there would really be but one necessary being.
From this

considerati~n

it appears that a necessary being

admits of no multiplication, precisely

because it is necessarT,

but it does not appear evident that intensive infinity follows
un!city., To prove this we have to prove that infinity follows
necessity, but this is what Suarez has not y&,t clearly
demonstrated.

10

The proofs for unicity, together with an evaluation, are
considered at length in Ch. IV, beginning on page48.
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To sum up our analysis or this third argument against
the possibility or intrinsic limitation, we say that, on the
supposition that tthere is only one necessary being, such a
being cannot be limited to possessing only some or the perrections which are possible, but that it is not clearly established that this being must be absolutely unlimited.
To prove this absolute inrinity Suarez next gives his
!. priori proor.

A priori autem solum potest probari per non
repugnantiam, vel negationem omnis causae,
vel rationis, ob quam necessitas essendi ut
sic, potius limitetur ad hoc genus perreotionis quam adlaliud, et ad huno gradum
quam ad melior em. 1
Berore we proceed to the rurther reasoning that sUbstantiates
this argument we find a difficulty in what is said.

Here

again he seems to be proving omniperfeotion rather than intensive inrinity.

A neoessary being, he states, oannot be

limited to one genus or perfeotion, nor to one grade or perfeotion.

It oannot be limited to anyone perfection.

It

cannot be limited to any grade or perfeotion we know in
oreatures, but must possess the creature perrection in a
higher degree.

.~

Godts perreotion, however, may be greater,

melior, than that or creatures, but does that make it inrinite?
Berore passing judgement, however, we must consider his rurther

11

F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. XXX, Sec. 2, n.23

29

reasoning in this matter.
We have already oonoeded that the neoessary being oannot be limited by an external cause.

When Suarez further

attempts to show that there can

intrinsic reason for

b~ ..no
,9

47

limitation, he seems to do little more than repeat his former
arguments whioh he termed

~

posteriori •

••• in omni genere perfeciionis possibilis
necessarium fuit ut tal is perfeotio
haberet in ali quo ente intrinseoam
neoessitatem essendi; ali~s non haberet
unde initium sumeret, aut ad alia entia
dimanaret, et idem est de quocumque
gradu possibili entitativae perfectionis. 12
What more does this say than that every possible perfection
must have as its source the one, necessary being?

There re-

mains the supposition, as yet not proven, that the possibles
are infinite.

There remAins also the difficulty which oomes

from his considering the possibles as only syncategorematioally infinite.

But we still reserve our judgement in order to

consider another argument immediately following the preceding.
Ergo ipsa ratio entis ut sic, postulat
ut secundum totam suam latltudinem perfeotionis possibllem, aut vere excogitabilem, habeat in allquo ente
necessitatem essendi vel formallter, vel
eminenter; non potest habere hanc
necessitatem quasi divisam et partitam
in plura entia necessaria, ut supra

12

Ibid. n.23.
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~
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12

Ibid. n.23.

probatum est; ergo necesse est ut
illam habeat quasi congregatam tot am
in uno ente per se necessario, et
13
hoc ipsum est illud ens esse infinitum.
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.'

According to this argument, whatever there is of being must
be had unparticipated by the first being, and this first
being by virtue of all that it possesses is infinite.
But how do we know that being, or !!!!, is of itself
infinite? :F1N)m:the arguments we have considered it appears
that Suarez thought being to be infinite because it could be
participated ad infinitum.

But do we know that it can be

participated ad infinitum?

The

pos~ibility

of infinite par-

ticipation must be proven either from the nature of the unparticipated, or from the infinity of participated

beings~

Suarez argues mostly from the fact that the possible, participated beings are infinite, butj as we have said so frequently, we do not know that the Possibles are infinite until
we know that their cause is infinite.

buarez really gives no

argument for the infinity of the unparticipated, considered
in itself, but only assertions.

In brief, he proves the im-

possibility of intrinsic limitation for !B!

~ ~

either

b,~

saying that we know of no limitation, "per negationem
limitationis", or by showing that ens a se cannot be limited

---

13

Ibid. n. 23.
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to anyone created perfection, or even to the same g»ade of
perfection that creatures have.

He, himself, does not seem

to feel certain that his proofs will satisfy, for he adds
to his !. priori proof:

"!1

revera .!!! haec sufficiens demon-

st'ratio, nisi quis velit voluntarie pertinax ~."l4
In this criticism our chief point hAS been that Suarez
has not demonstrated that a pure act of
oause, is without intrinsio limitation.
have said, show only that this aot of
limitations whioh

0

reatures have.

~,

which has no

All his proofs, we

~

does not have the

It must now be added that

he denies the prinoiple whioh St. Thomas uses to prove the
infinity of

~

subsistens, but does not substitute a new

prinoiple.

He begins the seotion in whioh he gives

his

proofs for infinity by presenting and rejecting the proof of
St. Thomas.

This proof of Thomas was given briefly in a
15
preceding ohapter.
Suarez rejects it, thus.
Ego vero existimo rationem non esse
effioacem, si in hoc fundetur, quod
essentia non pot est esse finita, nisi sit
potentia vere ao proprie reoeptiva ipsius
esse, et e converso, esse non posse esse
finitum, nisi sit vere receptum in
assentia, tamquam in potentia proprie
passiva et reoeptiva... ut argo esse sit
finitum satis est ut sit reoeptum ab alia

14 Ibid. n.23.
15 cr:-Ch. I, 1'.10.
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in tanta et tanta perfeotionis mensura,
etiamsi proprie non sit ~~oeptum in
aliqua potentia passiva.'
Note Qaretully the last sentenoe.
is an imperfeot aot.

A

~

limited, or finite aot

If God oan produoe an aot whioh, with-

out being reoeived into a potenoy, oan still be limited in
the very respeot in which it is an act, then that aot must
have its own intrinsic prinoiple of limitation.

For God can

produce only those beings whioh are intrinsecally possible.
But if an act can, preoisely in so far as it is aot, have
an intrinsio limitation, Suarez has no olear right to postulate that a non-reoeived aot is infinite until he adduoes
some turther proof for this.
That Suarez should hold suoh a pos1'ion is to be expeoted trom his stand on act and potenoy in general. Certainly he makes use of these oonoepts;-but he does not use them
in the striot sense that Thomists employ.

Aot and potenoy

are not oonsidered by him as prinoiples of being;

they are

considered as applying in the striot sense only in the order
of essenoes.

Moreover, even in the order of essenoes potenoy

is oonsidered not merely as a oapaoity for perfeotion,

bu~

over and above this as being in itself an imperfeot aot.
A thorough examination of his whole position on aot and

16

F. Suarez,

Disputationes Metaphysioae,

~.XXX,

Seo.2, n.19.
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potency would be out ot place here.

Such a

consider~ion

ot his notions would have to be very lengthy, since he does
not gather them together in anyone place to lay down definite
principles.

The few statements made about his doctrine, how-

ever, can be justitied.
be related to

~

That he does not consider essence to

as potency to act is evident trom his whole

disputation concerning the distinction between essence and
existence.

It he identities them, as he clearly does, there

can be no question of their being distinct principles; there
can be no composition save in the essence itselt which is
one and the same as
~ ~

quia

the~.

" ••• Dicendum

~

compositionem

!1 essentia, analogice tantum compositionem appellari

~ ~

compositio realis." 17

For Suarez an essence

really distinct from its!!!! would not be a real being.
"Repugnat enim ent-1tatem constitui in esse entitatis per

-

aliquid

~ ~

18

condistinctum."

~--

This opinion, moreover, is

corroborated by a close follower of Suarel, Descoqs.

"The

composition of act and potency in the proper sense ••• belongs
19
uniquely to the order of essence."
Maquart, throughout
his E1ementa Philosophiae, treats the doctrine ot Suarez, + ~nd
~

17 Ibid., D. XXXI, Sec. 8, n. 7.
18 lDIa., Sec. 6, n.2.
19 ~escoqs, op cit. II, 566. La composition d'acte et de
puissance au sens propre ••• appartient uniquement ~ ltordre
de lfessence.
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explicitly insists that for Suarez subjective potenev is an
20
imperfect act. This latter is beyond doubt true in the case
of prime matter, which Suarez conceives as having its own
entitative act.

"Dicendum

~

ergo l'rimo, materiam.BQ.!l

vocari puram potentiam respectu omnis actus metaphysici, id
est, quia nullum actum metaphysicum includit; hoc enim verum

!!!!

21

~

- -

--

potest."

Now, if essence and existence are not to be considered
as real potency and act, certainly the principle of limitation
of act by potency will not apply to them.

If essence and

existence are identical, then to say that existence is limited
by essence is simply to say that existence limits itself.
"

And since all the bei#gs we know from experience are limited,
some special reason must be found to show that a non-received
existence is infinite.
In the particular case of the limitation of

~

which

we have been considering, the position of Suarez evidently
follows on his manner of conceiving
essence and existence.

~,

and its components,

While he strongly denies that

actually univocal, - for that would involve pantheism

20

en~

~,

is

his

F. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, A. Blot (editor),
Paris, 1938, III h, 60.
21 F. Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, D. 4111, Seo.5, n.g
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concept seems to be univocal, since it represents all.beings
only in so far as they are similar, prescinding entirely trom
their differences.
Sic ergo explicata hac precisione rationis
in conceptu objectivo,.non est difficile
ostendere reperiri in conceptu objectivo
entisquia per conceptum formalem entis,
neque Deus neque substantia creata, neque
accidens representatur, secundum modum
quo in re sunt; neque prout inter se
differunt; sed solum prout aliquo mod~
inter se conveniunt, ac s1milia sunt.

Ex his infero primo, in hoc conceptu entis
objectivo, et sic praeciso non includi
actu modos intrinsecos substantiae v!t
aliorum membrorum quae dividunt ens.
Such a concept of being contains its inferiors only
24
potentially.
It is obtained by total abstraction, that is
by abstracting a superior notion from one of its inferiors,
in the way genus is taken from a species.

25

It is not a de-

termined but an indetermined concept.
As the concept of being is potential and obtained by
tot~l

abstraction, so is the concept of essence.

26

A concept

thus prescinded is not a sufficient basis for arguing to a
real distinction in beings, and, as we know, Suarez explicitlY

22

Ibid. D. II, Sec. 2, n. 16.

23

'!DI'Q. n.20.

25

~quart,

24 !DI'Ci. n.2l.
26

OPe cit.,

Ibid. II, 88.

II, 8-9.
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denies this real distinction.

MOreover, essence,

wh~h

merely prescinds trom existence, contains it potentially,
and is identified with it in the real order, can be a distinct, limiting principle only in the logical order.

In the

real order the essence is the limited being.
Suarez himself does not speak in so many words of

~

being conceived by total abstraction, but this follows logically from his identification of essence and existence.

If

essence and existence are one, then a concept of

~

is had

by abstracting from its various inferiors.

a concept

~uch

may represent!!!! as unlimited, but this absence of limit is
really an absence of determination.

~sse,
.............

thus prescinded

trom all the determinations with which it is identified in
the real order, can be but an indetermined something, an abstraction of the second intention.

Descoqs, moreover, in-

sists that such a concept of !!!! is in accord with the mind
of Suarez.

He says that when we conceive!!!! as being in it-

self unlimited we are concerned not with an absence of imperfection, but with an absence of determination.
27
being which can exist only in the mind.

We have a

On such a foundation Suarez logically rejects the

27

P. Descoqs,

Ope

cit., II, 837.
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Thomistic proof.
its place?

But ought he not substitute someth1»g in

His arguments. up to now have not been conclusive

for the existence of an infinite God.

One more proof remains,

however, and this will be considered in the following chapter.

CHAPTER

TV

INFINITY OF GOD PROVED FROM CREATION

This final proof is based

.

0[3

created the universe, and that
power.
Aliud

"~principium
principium~,

infinitam. tf

1

t.o principles: that God

c~eation

requires an infinite

est, .1Jeuun habere.!!.m
ad creandum •••
,..

ad creandunn requiri virtutem Simpliciter

This is certainly a valid approach, an argument

from an effect to tm nature of Its cause.

'We have already'

seen that it is one of the proofs used by St. Thomas.
must be investigated is whether C)r not

~uarez

What

succeeds in

clearly proving these two princi}ples which he enuntiates.
To prove that God produced

~he ~r~d

and all beings save

Himself from nothing, t:;uarez uses :induction and deduction. ,...
He seems to place his greatest

cC)n~idence

in the inductive

argument, which consists in a cOrls:ideration of all beings
material and spiritual.

He

firs~

bodies, then earthly bodies, and

considers the heavenly
finally spiritual sUbstances.

The heavenly bodies, stars, moon, and sun, must ha.e
been created because they cannot have being from themselves.

I

~'.

Suarez,

Dlsp.u:t~t1ones 14et~ph7~icae, D.

38

XXX, Sec.2, n.15.

,
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rrhis is proven by various considerations.

J.i'irst of a.1.l the

planets cannot have existence by virtue of their essenoe, beoause there are more noble creatures which do not exist of
themselves, but depend on God for their very being.
~

multo nobiliores coelis

patet maxi me de homine."

2

~

"~uia

sunt absque efficientia, ut

For Suarez it is unthinkable that

lesser beings should have perfections which higher beings do
not have, especially if it is the case of the highest possible
perfection,

~

!!.!!.

How he demonstrates that man is de-

pendent for his being will be considered a little farther on.
Secondly, the heavenly bodies oannot move themselves, but require an external mover.
fecti,

!!:1 indigeat 'motu

"~quia
~

coeli adeo sunt imper-

complementum suarum actionum,

~

praeterea extrinseoo motore qui illo& moveat: !.Q quod!.! !!.
motum ilIum habere !!Q.!! possint; ertSo multo minus verisimile
est ex se habere esse."

-~-

-

3

Thirdly, there'is the fact that the

heavenly bodies do not constitute a little world of their own,
but are very much a part of the universe, having effect on
earthly bodies, as"tor example, the moon on the tides.

In

the time of Suarez, of course, this influence of the heavenly
bodies was considered to be even greater.

2
3

Ibid. Sec. 1, n.15.
n. 15.

'!'Si(!'.

The point, however,
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is that since these bodies are so bound up in the w07kings of
the creatures of earth they must have been made by the same
cause who produced the earth, and never have had existence
of themselves.
Item videmus coelos in omnibu~ suis virtutibus, aspectibus, et motibus, ita
esse constitutos, sicut expediebat ad
conservationem inferiorum rerum, et
earum generationes et corruptiones; ergo
est evidens argumentum non esse a se sed 4
conditos fuisse a communi omnium auctore."
In answer to this last reasoning, however, it might be
objected that perhaps the heav,enly bodies had existence of
themselves and were simply fitted into the workings of the
universe by some supreme being who took it upon himself to
bring order into disorder.

Suarez would probably reply, as

he does to a similar objection, that this being who took it
upon himself to order the whole universe must be the ultimate
final cause-of the whole.

The ultimate final cause, however,

must also be the first efficient cause, and so this being
who orders must be the one who gives being in the first place.
"Quia .!!Q!! pot est universum'8\tbernari nisi ab ..!2. cuius .£.Q.!!.

silio et potentia conditum tuit."

5

This reply of Suarez, however, does not seem cogent

4
5

Ibid. n.15.
Ibid. D. XXIX, Sec. 2, n. 9.
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enough to meet the objection.

He argues that the

hea~enly

bodies must be contingent, because God is their final cause
and, therefore, their efficient cause.

But would God have

to be the final cause if these heavenly bodies were neoessary,
as the objeotion supposes?

It seems neoessary to prove the

contingenoy of these beings before postulating God as their
final cause.

The mere fact that He orders them is not enough

to justify calling Him the final cause.

We know, for example,

from human experience that a person may take existing beings
and join them into an ordered whole without becoming thereby
the final cause of either the whole or its parts.

Suarez

seems here to suppose that which is yet to be proven, and
thus not to answer the objection.

However, since it will

appear later that even though we grant to Suarez a proof for
the creation of all things we know of, he still cannot deduce
infinity from this, there is no need of delaying longer on
this.
Suarez next endeavors to prove that earthly bodies cannot have existence of themselves.

All earthly bodies exist

as single individuals, and all the individuals that we know
today are contingent.

From this Suarez deduces that the first

of these species of individuals was brought into being by
some external cause, and did not have being of itself.

For,

if the first individual of eaoh speoies had had being of itwelf
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and given being to the oonsequent members, there would be a
oontradiotion;

the first member would be both oontingent,

as a member of a oontingent speoies, and neoessary, as existing of itself.

Therefore, all members of all existing

speoies that we know are

oontingeft~\

have their being from

some superior cause •
••• quia omnes speoies rerum, quae ilIa
sunt, in suis individuis'iunt; ergo
in nulla speoie illarum rerum potest
esse aliquod individuum non faotum, sed
ex se habens esse: nam haeo esset magna
differentia,' et maxime essentiale inter
tale individuum et alia, etsoonsequenter
non essent eiusdem speciei.
We see that this whole argument comes to this; oorporeal
substanoes must be oontingent because we are immediately
aware of their generations and oorruptions, that is, of their
not having being of their own right.
However, as has already been noted, the anoient Greek
Philosophers, while realizing that the composite beings of
this earth must have had some cause, thought,.nonetheless,
that the matter out of whioh these beings were formed was of
itself necessary.

Suarez notes this as an objeotion to his

tI

.-

argument.
Rogo rursus, an materia ipsa faota sit,

S

Ibid., D. XX, Seo. 1, n. lS.
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neone. Et quidem Philosophi fere
omnes materiam negaverunt esse faotam,
sed asseruerunt esse ooaeternam Deo,
et ex se ao omnino neoessario habentem
esse. In quo errore fuisse StoiC¥s,
Pythagoreos, et Platonem ipsum •••

.'

Suarez 1:m:m.ediattly affirms, however, that this is "alienum
~ ~

rationi naturali, praeter dicta in priori assertione

!l praeter

~

quae communia sunt omnibus entibus creatis."

8

And then he shows why prime matter cannot be necessary, but
must also be the result of creation.
things which in

~ny

First of all, of all

way :rejoice in the title, "being", prime

matter is the most imperfect, and, as such, certainly cannot
have a perfection which superior beings .. lack.
Nam oum illa sit infilla omnium substantiarum etiam corrupt ibilium , incredibile est illam habere hanc perfectionem sllmmam , quae est ex se hatlere esse,
cuius perfectionis aliae species omnes
rerum generabiliuw, et formae illarum
non sunt capaces.·
.'
Secondly he places a disjunction.

If prime matter is

necessary and coaeternal with God, in the beginning it either
had no substantial form, or had one of it.elf.

It could not

have existed without any form because it ,is ordered by its
very nature to union with a form.
7 Ibid. n.17.
S T6Tci. n.1S.
g 'IDI<i. n.1S.

without a form it would
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have been in a preternatural state.
Primwm dioi non potest quia repugnat
naturae materiae, nam licet non implicet oontradiotionem, tamen est
a1i.num a naturali ordine rerum, et
ideo verlsimile non est materiam
habere suam entitatem ex se, et tamen
habere eam in statu praeternaturali,
et absque ulla formali perfeotione, et]D
oonsequ~nter absque usu vel utilitate. c
On the other hand prime matter could not have existed
with a substantial form which it had

neoessari~y,

be'oause

this would mean not only that prime matter was neoessary, but
even some oorporeal substance was neoessary.

The form, whioh

prime matter would have had from its very necessity, would
b~

a necessary form,one which could not be separated from

the matter, and'as a oonsequence substantial ohange would be
impossible.
Si aut habuit formam allquam ex se;
ergo jam non sola materia, sed quaedam
substantia integra est ex se habens
esse. Ex quo u1terius fit, tota ill a
substantia esse simplioiter neoessaria,
et tam non posse esse quam ipsam materiam
primam, quia quod est inde pendens ab
alio in siO esse, non potest illud
amittere. ~
It oan be objeoted that the disjunotionwhioh Suarez
plaoed at the beginning of the preceding argument was not
10
11

Ibid. n.1B.

lDlCr. n.1B.

-
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complete.

Perhaps prime matter always existed with

but not a necessary form.

~'form,

Perhaps from all eternity God

supplied it. with some form whereby it might have a natural
existence.

Suarez was prepared for this objection.

"Sed

hoc etiam dici non potest, tum qUi1t 47involvit repugnantiam ••• ,
tum etiam qUia alias ilIa forma ex necessitate naturae manerEtt
12
·
!! Deo."
The repugnance would consIst in matter's having
of itself, and yet. not having all that is required for

~

~.

It would still be necessary, pecause if God supplied

it freely there would be no reason for its being eternal.
"Est autem contra rationem naturalem dicere Deum agere extra

-

13

se necessitate
-.

naturae."

--

Furthermore, since God conserves

by the same act by which He produces, the form, and consequently the substance, would still be necessary, and substantial
ohange would 'be impossible.
necessitate

agi~ ~

"Et praeterea sequitur qua

illam formam, eadem conservare illam:

et conse2"uenter materiam!!.! necessitate,seJlper
1
forma."

~

sub i1la

Having given these arguments Suarez feels that his case
fO,r the c-reation. of material beings is strong enough, and he
.,.

turns to a consideration of spiritual beings, the rational
soul and angels.
12 Ibid. n.19.
13 Ibid. n.19.
14 IbId. n.19.

-

The only argument which can prove the
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-

The only argument which can prove the
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creation of angels, on the supposition that there ara'angels,
is the argument which proves that there can be only one
~~.

~

This argument can also be applied to the rational soul

and to all material beings, but before investigating it we
will consider another proof for the creation of the rational
soul, which is more similar to the arguments for the creation
of material beings.

(We recall that some of the arguments

just given depend on this proof that the soul does not have
being of itself.)
Man, as composed of matter and form, body and soul, is
certainly contingent.

For we have immediate evidence of his

generation and corruption, birth and death.

But, granted

that the matter of which he is composed is contingent, what
about the form?

Since the rational form is not educed from

matter, perhaps it has a preexistent state of being, is in
itself necessary.

Suarez .i8 not at all willing to admit that

the soul has existence prior to its union with the body.
"Esset error non solum in fide sed etiam contra rationem
'15----naturalem."
But even if it had, it still would owe its
whole being to God, would be produced by creation.

jlor t"he

soul by its very nature is ordered to union.with the body, So
that its separated existence is not natural; and it is not

15

Ibid. n. 21.

possible that a being should have its

~

trom its ve;y

essenoe, end yet not have it in a natural manner.

The soul,

therefore, whioh is not eduoed trom matter and does not have
existence trom itself oan owe its being only to the oreative
aot of God.
Nam etiamsi animae essent ante oorpo~a,
non tamen essent a se, et sine effioiente:
quia praeter alias rationes taotas, oum
anima. sit naturalis forma oorporis, siex
se neoessario esset, ex aeternitate existeret inf6rmaDdo oorpus: nam res quae ez
se habet esse non potest habere illud in
praeternaturali statu ••• Igitur live
anima informare inoipiat oum oorpure,
sive ante illud, neoessarium est habere
oausam effioienxem, et oonsequenter fieri
per oreationem.
Before passing on to the argument whioh demonstrates
that there oan be only one

~ ~ ~

are due to the preceding arguments.

a few words ot comment
First of all, it is to

be noted that all the arguments for oreation thus tar oonsidered prove only that the beings we know must have come
about through the creative aot ot God.

They do not prove

th~

all possible beings, save God alone, must be either be oreated
or never oome into existenoe.

Seoondly we recall that none
~

":

of ,the arguments prooeed from the very nature of being itself,
as do the arguments ot St. Thomas.
16

Ibid. Seo. 1, n. 21.

That the argument s do not
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proceed from the very notion of being, or !!!!, is

t~'be

ex-

pected in virtue of what has already been seen concerning the
Suarezian concept

of~.

Furthermore, as a eonae'quenee of

this method of arguing, there will be some difficulty in

e~

tablishing the God of creation as infinite in the very "realm
of being.
In opposition to the preceding proofs the final proof,
~ased

on the nature of

~ ~~,

does intend to prove that

all possible beings, save God alone, must be produced by God

from nothing.

Briefly, it says that there is one uncaused

cause, and only one; and that, therefore, whatever else

~

must look baQk to this being as source and cause.
When he is treating creation Suarez states this proof
in a few words.

"Verumtamen

~

illis (rebus immaterialibus)

nullum fieri potest speciale argumentum praeter illud univer-

!!!! sumptuml;x

~

improducta.n

To get a full treatment of this proof we must

principio quod repugnat dari plura entia

go to his disputation on the existence of God.
His first step is to prove that there is one

~ ~ ~.

After having rejected the prinCiple "Quidquid movetur ••• ", he
gives another principle which is metaphysical and which will

17

~.,

D. XX, Sec. 2, n. 21.
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be the basis of his proof.

"OnIDe quod fit ab alio fi .. : sive

oreetur .!.!!.! generetu;-, sive quaoumgue ratione fiat."

18

This

prinoiple is too evident to require more than a brief explanation.

However, before prooeeding to this explanation,

a few words about the differenoe between the Suarez ian prinoiple and the Thomistio "Quidquid movetur" seem in order.

In

expression they seem to oome to the same thing, sinoe the

t~~"

of Suarez and the "movetur" of Thomas seem to express the same
idea.

Suarez himself explains in what he wanted his prinoiple

to differ from that of Thomas.

iJ:'hat being whioh is moved is

supposed "to already exist, while that whioh beoomes is not
supposed to have already had existenoe.
ready

exis~s

The , being whioh al-

before aoquiring a new perfeotion may-have

had

thatperfeotion virtually, and thus been able to move itself.
But a being whioh is non-existent

poss"ess its per19
feotion virtually, and so requires an effioient oause.
In
~annot

view of this reasoning Suarez rejeoted the prinoiple of Thomas,
as not applying to all eases, and substituted one of his own.
The prinoiple of Suarez oan be briefly explained.

When

a oreature passes from the realm of non-being to that of being,
18

19

Ibid., D. :x:x::tX,
Ibid., n. 20.

S~o.

,1 .. n."'~O.
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it itself can certainly not be,the cause of the transit, for
that would mean that at the same time it both was and was
not; in short, it would be its own cause.
Quod principium ex eo de.monstratur, quod
nihil potest efficere see Nam res quae
fit per effectionem acquirit esse: res
autem quae facit vel producit supponit~r
habere esse, et ideo claram repugnantiam
involvit quod idem faciat seipsum: prius
enim quam res fit, non potest esse in
act~oformali vel virtuali ad faciendum
see
With this principle established the proof is fairly simple.

In syllogistic form it is:
Every being which exists is either made,
or not made.
But, there cannot be, in the production of
OiIng, either an infinite series of causes,
or causes which act upon one another as members of a circle.
Therefore, there must be some unmade, or uncreated being.

Part of the Minor, perhaps, needs further explanation.

The

causes whioh oooperate to produce being would act on one
another in a circular process, if cause A were to produce B,
B were to produoe 0, and then 0, in some strange manner, were
to cause the being of A.
impossible.

That this should happen is evidently

As Suarez points out, this would really be

equivalent to having a being cause itself.

20

Ibid., n. 20.

~ ~
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Huno ergo oirculum dicimus esse impossibilem, et aeque repugnantem illi
principio, omne quod produoitur ab
alio producitur ••• Nam si res una fit
ab alia a se faota mediate saltem'zrt
quasi in virtute efficit se ipsam.

.'

Neither oan there be an infinite series of causes Which
are per!! subordinate.

For, unless the series of oauses

leads to some unoaused being, there is really no. explanation
of the final effeot.
Impossibilem est totam oolleotionem
entium vel oausarum effioientium esse
dependentem in suo esse et operari:
ergo necesse est esse in illis aliquid
independens: ergo non potest in~llo
progressu in infinitum prooedi.
If eaoh member of the series is dependent, the series as a
whole must be dependent; if the series is dependent there
must be something outside of it whioh sustains it and explains
23
the causality. "Nam ••• ~ quod dependet ab alio dependet."
And yet the supposition is that there is no being outside the
dependent series whioh explains the being and aotion of the
series.

~herefore,

either there is some independent, uncaused

being, or there is only contradiotion •
.Sic ergo impossibile est totam oolleotionem
entium esse factam, aut totam oolleotionem
oausarum esse dependentem in agendo, propria dependentia~4quia posterior oausa
pendet a priori.
21
22
23
24

Ibid., n.23.
n.26.
n.26.
n.25.

IOIa.,
~.,
fbld.,

52

But granted there is an unoaused bein& this is
God, muoh less an i4finite God.

n~t

yet

Suarez olearly realizes this

and prooeed to the demonstration, first of one necessary being
who produoed the visible universe, and seoondly of one being
who exoludes the possibility of any other, who is unious.
One oreator of the visible world is deduced from the order in the universe.

.

One being alone must be ruling the world

to give it the orderly motion it has, the oooperation of animate and inanimate, rational and

irrationa~

beings.

V~reover,

this supreme being oould not order the world so well unless
he had produced it in the first plaoe.
versum gubernari nisi ab

~

n~

cuius consilio

~

nan

poteat

potentiA

uni-

~_

ditum fuit. n25
He follows up with various

a~guments

to show why there

could not be several neoessary beings who cooperated to produce the world, and who now rule it in peaoeful agreement.

26

The arguments are suasive, but not exactly metaphysioal and
doubt- destroying.

Therefore it

see~

best to pass over these

considerations and go on to the metaphysical
Deus Unious.

25
26

Ibid., D. XXrx,'Seo. 2, n. 9.
iDt[., n. 21-29.
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Atter having rejected arguments of Soncinas

and.~homas

for the unicity of God Suarez proceeds to his own solution.
This proof has already been briefly presented in a previous
27
chapter.
A necessary being does not permit either numericalor speoific multiplication, because any differentiating
note or specific difference would have to come from the being's
necessity, and hence should be the same tor each being.

Now

a more thorough explanation is in place.
First of all it is impossible that a necessary being
should be multiplied numerically, that there should be many
individuals of the same species.

In such multiplication the

differentiating notes, that which makes the i,ndividual distinct from other members of the species, must be outside the
essence; for otherwise there would be no multiplioation.
Quia ubicumque ratio communis est multiplieabilis secundum diversas naturas
singulares, esto non sit n~eesse singularitatem in re ipsa distingui a natura
communi, oportet tamen ut aliquo modo
sit extra essentiam talis naturae, nam
si esset illl essentialis, revera~alis
natura non esset multiplicabilis.
But a necessary being can have no notes or constituents
are not essential to it.
27
28

~~ich

"In ente autem improducto impossibile

cf. Dh. III, p.27.
F. Suarez, Dlsputatlones Metaphyslcae, D. XXIX, Sec. 3,
n. 21.
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est

!!! s1ngula.r1tas ill. .!.!E! essentiam naturae elus . :,,29 The

reason 1s that the esse ot a necessary belng flows ~=rom Its
essence,

and there Is no real!!!! other than a slng"tllar

"§.!.g ~ .!'!Q.!!

!.!! nlsl !!! sigsular1s, ut singularis

~.

est.

Er-

.!!! ut, slngularitss talls naturae .ill etlA!31m de .,!!sentia'!!y!, et consequenter !1 talis natura .!!QA slt communi-

S.Q. necesse

cabilis."

30

Whatever a necessary being has must com4119 from its

essence, and the essence, or the necessity, cannot b4S in potency to various differentiating notes, slnoe this wC!:)uld require an outside cause to bring about the different lIDlembers
of the speoies.

Thus, at least, Suarez argues for ta"le im-

possibility of numerical multiplication.
Secondly Suare. argues that there cannot be sev.e9ral
necessary beings which fall under one genus but diff.er by
virtue of a specific differenoe.
Quia sicut in coneeptu essentiali illius
naturae, quae ex se neoessario esf;, includi tur singularitas, etiam inoludi tur
tota essentia talis naturae singularis;
ergo impossibile est, quod haeo essentia
entis neoessari1 sit alia et alia... Non
potest oonstitul in tali vel tal~l rationi
essentiali, per aliquid additum.
If there were several necessary beings differing

29 Ibid., n. 21.
30 !"6'Id., n. 21.
31 ll):[a., n. 22.

spe~ifieally,
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.'

there would have to b$ some note by which they fliffered.
They could not differ in so far as neoessary, bE9cause their
necessity is what is common to eaoh.

The

would have to be something added to the

speoi~10

differenoe

neoessi~y.

No exter-

nal oause oould effect the differenoe, sinoe
selves the sole oause of their being.

th~y

Neither

are themthe

~ould

speoifio differenoe oome from the necessity, siL1Qe in every
oase the differenoe would have to 'be the same, Sllld thus there
would remain but one being.
This argument of Suarez, however, for the

jl~ossibility

of several neoessary beings differing speoificalLly , is not
satisfaotory.

Suarez insists that from the

neo~asity

of such

beings there could oome but one speoific differeallce, and that
there COUld, therefore, be but one necessary beLng.

This

supposes, however, that the concept of necessity- is univocal
whiie it seems rather to be analosOus.

For all that we know

it may be of the essence of a necessary being to be multiplied.
The concept of a necessary being may oontain various individuating notes

~,

implicite.

Moreover, these arguments of Suarez for the 'Unicity of
a necessary being are not consonant with his own prinoiple
of individuation.

~piritual

beings for him are :individuated

by their very entity, not by anything else.

" •• • J?onstat JJl
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eis

~

posse

~

aliud principiunm indiv1duationis pDaeter

ipsam uniuscuiusque rei entitatem •• _.
accidentibus,

~

sumenda est ab
32
est aliud unde sUJ.m.i potest.
According~

ft

ly he holds that angels of the sames species may be multiplied

.

numerically by their distinct entitlttes without any notes added
to the essence.

It would seem to fitollowfrom this that there
~ilfer1ng

could be several necessary beings
nor in virtue of something added
their different entities.

t~

~pecifi~

seem possible in this position.

not essentially,

the essence, but only by
multiplication would also

FCDr Tholilists angels differ.

speoifically, and the difference oaan be explained by means
of the real oomposition of essence
however, has no real composition

and elistence.

o~ essen~e

Suarez,

and existenoe in

the entity of angels whioh he oan uase to explain speeitic
differences; for him there is noth1-ng but the entity to ex,,",

plain the differenoe.

To follow thais position logioally he

ought to hold that there oan be sevreral moessary beings
differing specifioally by virtue or:' their very entities, without any appeal to added notes.
In the light of this criticismA it cannot be said that
",

Suarez has proven that there can

be~

but one neoessary being.

He has rejected potency as the indi-viduating factor, and has

-

32 Ibid., D. V, Sec. 6, n. 17.
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thus placee a serious obstacle in his path to provint'the
unicity of a necessary being.

If he cannot demonstrate that

there is but one necessary being, he oan hardly go on to prove
that there is a necessary being

who

is infinite.

However, by

supposing ror the time that he has proven this unicity, it is
possible to go on and see how he endeavors to show that this
one neoessary being is infinite.
At the beginning of this oha.pter two prinoiples were
given whigh present in brief the proof for infinity from the
fact of oreation.

We have considered one of them, that God

has the power to create.

There remains the second, that cre-

ation requires an infinite power.

Suarez endeavors to prove

this latter in two ways: first, by a consideration of all the
objects of creation taken collectively; secondly, by an appeal
to the creation of even one being.
He proposes the first proof in various ways.

God pro-

duced all the different grades of being, and in each grade
various species.

And all this was done by God alone without

the help of a material cause, or of an assisting secondari
cause.

The conclusion is that God can Jroduce whatever is

possible, that is, what eyer is not intrinsecal1y repugnant.

33

~., D,.

XXX, Sec. 2, n. 16.
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In producing all beings God caused the first

es~e

which

any of them had; nothing of being was presupposed in the objects of His causal activity.

Consequently being, or

~,

is the adequate object of the power of God, and His power ex,. ....

.34

tends to everything that can participate being.
The productive power ot God, moreover, is never exhausted •

.

No matter how many beings He creates, He can always create
more; no matter how perfect a being He creates, He can always
35
create a more perfect one. These three considerations can be brought together, and
one conclusion drawn.

They all say the same thing.

The power

of God extends to all possible beings and perfections, which
beings and perfections are infinite in number am variety.'
The conclusion: therefore, God is infinite.
But here again is the difficulty so

freq~ ntly

referred

to in the eXamination of the other proofs for infinity.

What

justification is there for postulating that the objeots ot
God's power are infinite in number aDd perfeotion, until we
know that God is infinite?

Suarez, at least, gives no proof

for the infinity of the possibles, and so, in proportion as
34 Ibid., n. 16.
35 !'DId., n.16.
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he depends on the infinite possibles, he fails to establish
clearly the infinity of God.

To forestall objections it must

be noted that from the infinity of the Possibles Suarez intends to prove that God is categorematically infinite, not
merely syncategorematically infinite.

1!!! ~ infinita syncategorematice,
habet existentem

"~egue

~~

pot est virtus

simul

~

actu

t~ ~ virtutem~~erfectionem."

it be recalled again that Suarez

conside~s

~

It

the possibles only

syncategorematically infinite, his position is rendered more
difficult.
There is, however, one instance Inwhieh Suarez makes
no appeal to the infinity of possible perfeotions.

The

creation of even one being, he says, requires an infinite
power.
Et hoc etiam modo existimo satis pro-

bari posse talem potentiam non modo
ut se extendit ad omne ereabile, sed
etiam ut determinata ad er~~ndttm quodlibet ens, esse infinitam.

Why does the creation of even one being require an infinite
power?

St. Thomas argued that the farther reduced trom act

a being was, the greater was the power required to bring it
into being.
36

37

For example, greater power is required to heat

Ibid., D. XX, Sec. 2, n. 4.

Ibid., n.

6.
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water than air because the potency of the water is fapther
away from the act of heat than is the potency of air.

If'

,

then, a being was infinitely distant from act, - and such is
the case of non-being, or nothing t which has no passive potency
whatsoever, - an infinite active power was required to produce
38
the being.
But this reasoning did not satisty Suarez.
First of all he did not believe that non-being was infinitely
distant from being, but only indefinitely distant.

39

Further-

more, he did not see why an infinite power was required to
produce a being from no passive potency •
••• quia independentiaactionis a subjecto
non videtur esse tanti momenti, nec tantam indi~are perfectionem, ut requirat in
agent. virtutem infinitam simpliciter.
Cur e~~~tm? Nam concursus materiae quid
finitum est. Cur ergo suppleri non poterit
per virtutem agentis superioris ordinis~O
et perfectioris, esto infinita non s,it?

How, then, did he conolude that an infinite power was
required to create even one being?

His explanation was that

an efficient cause which produced a being without any assistance from either pre-existing matter, or from any superior
cause, was necessarily infinite.
Alio item modo potest intelligi potentia
creandi, quae habet vim se sola, et absque dependentia vel concursu alterius
38 T. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, c. 43.
F. Suarez, Dlsputatlones Metaphysicae, D. XX, Bec. 2, n. 26.
Ibid., n. 8.
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ali quid ex nihi10 producere ••• talisque independeiiia infinitam requirit
perfectionem.
His position comes to this.

.'

Creation ultimately requires an

infinite power, but not every cause which creates is of
necessfty infinite.

God may use an.instrument, in which ease

the instrument will not be infinite.
But why does the first cause of creation have to be infinite when it acts entir$ly independently of any superior
cause? To this question the author could find no answer either
in the text of Suarez, or in the commentaries on Suarez.
Suarez promises to give an answer in his

treatmen~

of the con-

cursus of God with all secondary causes, in Disputation XXII;
but if it is there, it is presentej obscurely.

No explicit

mention is made.
And so on the one point where Suarez might be expected
to give a clear demonstration of the infinity of God we are
left without an answer that satisfies.

What is actually said

in this final proof, aside from the supposition that the unicit
of a necessary being has been demonstrated, cannot be

oba~cted

to, but neither can it be said to prove conclusively until
further evidence is discovered.

41

~.,

n. 4.

CONCLUSION
This paper has considered all the arguments that Suarez
presents for the infinity of God.

They were found to fall

into two general classes, one from the notion of
one trom the fact of creation.

~

A

~,

When Suarez reasoned from

the notion of the Supreme Being he either arrived only at
the omniperfection of God, that is, the extensive infinity,
or failed to sufficiently sUbstantiate his arguments.

He re-

jected the Thomistic limitation of act by potency alone, and
failed to substitute arguments that would prove God to have
no intrinsic limitation.
The argument trom creation also failed to prove Godts
intensive infinity.

First of all Suarez did not clearly

demonstrate that there can be but one necessary being, and
thus was unable to prove conclusively the fact ot creation.
Moreover, even on the supposition that creation was a proven
fact, his arguments for infinity fell short of the mark.

On

the other hand, he again rejected Thomistic arguments and
failed to substitute satisfactory reasoning of his own,
In conclusion it must be noted that this

pape~emphasized

primarily the fact that the proofs of Suarez are inconclusive
62
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as they stand.

Whether or not such proofs are completely

beyond the scope of Suarez ian philosophy remains an open
question, but in the light of the evidence produced it does
seem impossible to deduce the infinity of God from Suarezian
principles.

Moreover, it is highly improbable that a scholar

as great as Suarez would have failed to find these arguments,
if they were actually contained in his principles.
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